Small regimes in the Middle East: a conceptual

and theoretical alternative to small states in a non‑Western

region by Szalai, Máté
Vol.:(0123456789)
International Politics
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00266-0
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Small regimes in the Middle East: a conceptual 
and theoretical alternative to small states in a non‑Western 
region
Máté Szalai1,2,3 
 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
The concepts and theories of small state studies, a sub-discipline of international 
relations, have been connected to Western political development, making their appli-
cability in regions outside of Europe questionable. Using the framework of the Eng-
lish School, the present article aims at identifying the main elements of small state 
theory which are needed to be altered to make it suitable for the Middle East and 
North Africa. Investigating the regional manifestation of main primary institutions 
which form the basis of the analysis of small states (namely statehood, sovereignty, 
conflict and cooperation), the research concludes that the leverage of Middle Eastern 
small states is highly different than it is expected by traditional small state studies, 
especially due to the regional norms related to statehood and conflict. Consequently, 
changing our conceptual framework of “small states” to “small regimes” would be 
also necessary to better interpret how such entities behave in the Middle East or 
other regions of the world.
Keywords Small states · English school · Middle Eastern studies · Gulf states · 
Regimes
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Introduction
The research agenda of small state studies has always lacked a regional perspec-
tive, mainly due to three reasons: First, mainstream theories of IR usually suggest 
that state size is the key variable determining foreign policy due to the nature of 
the international system, labelling most of the other factors irrelevant (see Waltz 
1979; Neumann and Gstöhl 2006). Secondly, theories aiming at defying the main-
stream assumptions (especially neoliberal institutionalists and constructivist) 
either keep the (global) systemic viewpoint or jump immediately to the individual 
level of analysis, leaving the regional level untouched. Even innovative attempts 
(like Gigleux 2016 or the comparative studies in Archer et al. 2014) attempt only 
to connect the state and the structural level or limit themselves to an empirical 
comparison without deep theorisation. Third, theoretical schools which pos-
sess the toolkit to understand regional particularities (e.g. world system theory 
or regional security complex theory) are yet to have a substantial impact on the 
study of small states.
Nevertheless, regional differences can extremely alter the leverage and behav-
iour of small states. One can hardly question that a resource-scarce country 
located in the European Union or in the Persian Gulf has a strategically differ-
ent situation, not just due to the alterations of the geopolitical environment but 
to diverse normative circumstances as well. Such regional particularities should 
change how we view not just the status but the very nature of small states too—
without proper investigation, we cannot be even sure that the basic principles 
which guide our expectations vis-á-vis small state behaviour are valid in a spe-
cific geopolitical and normative environment. The present article attempts to 
identify the necessary alterations to traditional small state theory deriving from 
the particularities of the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region. 
Using the vocabulary provided by the English School (ES) of International Rela-
tions, my main argument is that due to the altered manifestation of primary insti-
tutions like “state” and “sovereignty” as well as “conflict” and “cooperation” in 
the MENA region (or other regions), the notions of mainstream small state stud-
ies are inapplicable.
Altering our traditional conceptual framework and viewpoint nevertheless ena-
bles us to detect different behavioural patterns. As a result of the investigation, 
I will argue for widening the vocabulary of small state studies and altering the 
usual unit of analysis from “small states” to “small regimes”, as the latter term, in 
specific normative environments, mirrors the nature of the actor in a more precise 
way. While the term is used to describe Middle Eastern small states, it can be 
applicable to actors with similar characteristics in other regions.
The article is divided into three parts: First, I will draw up the basic theoreti-
cal framework of the article building on the notions of ES and identify the pri-
mary institutions which set the leverage of small states. Second, I will move on 
to the investigation of such primary institutions in the MENA region and provide 
short case studies to demonstrate their importance. Third, I will summarise my 
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suggestions of alterations of small state theory to be applicable for regions out-
side of Europe.
With the analysis, I wish to contribute to three contemporary academic endeav-
ours in the IR literature: Firstly, to bridge the gap between theoretical and applied 
IR in Middle Eastern Studies (MES); secondly to contribute to the growing lit-
erature in regionalising mainstream theories of IR; and thirdly, to reassess the 
present focal points of small state studies which “may put too much emphasis on 
power and size and too little on the status of statehood” (Baldacchino 2014: 242).
Interpreting regional differences and smallness in the English School 
framework
Despite its decades-long history, the English School can still be considered as an 
emerging research programme in IR. Its basic idea is that the international system 
can be conceptualised as an “anarchic society” (a society of states) which incorpo-
rates elements of anarchy as well as formalised and institutionalised relations at the 
same time (that is why neither realism, nor liberalism can be used as a holistic the-
ory). In order to minimalise harm, to uphold agreements and to ensure possessions 
(Bull 2002: 4; Schouenborg 2014: 80), members of the society developed primary 
institutions—namely a “set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of 
common goals” (Bull 2002: 71) which “are evolved more than designed”, represent 
“fundamental and durable practices” and shape the leverage of political actors as 
well as their “patterns of legitimate activity in relations to each other” (Buzan 2004: 
167). Such abstract notions are protected and maintained through secondary institu-
tions, i.e. “physical regimes or organisations” (Schouenborg 2014: 80).
Naturally, the exact list of primary institutions is hard to make. Many differ-
ent notions have been mentioned by researchers including the five “classic ones” 
described by Headley Bull (diplomacy, war, balance of power, international law and 
great powers). These individual lists are heavily criticised and debated in the litera-
ture (Buzan 2004: 174). The discussion covers also the hierarchy between said insti-
tutions, the relationship between master and derivative institutions.
Despite having a systemic approach, the English School is quite effective in iden-
tifying and interpreting differences between regional sub-systems of the international 
society. While regionalism is not a primary feature of the ES literature, many argue 
that the “global society is unevenly developed to a very marked degree” (Buzan 
2004: 208). The reason lies in the origins of the international society, a mostly Euro-
pean construct which spread across the rest of the world through colonialism and 
other forms of encounters and was solidified after decolonisation, opening up the 
society to the “Third World” (Buzan and Little 2014: 61).1 While in theory, the pro-
cess included the transfer of Western political forms (such as states) to the rest of the 
world, nevertheless in practice, these legal (and cultural) models never managed to 
1 See Yost (1979) for a discussion of works of F.S. Northedge, Martin Wright and Hedley Bull on differ-
ent historical state systems and their interactions.
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completely overcome “the complex and competing forces that they encountered on 
the ground” (Buzan and Little 2014: 62) such as tribal affiliations and other forms 
of collective self-help systems (Salzman 2016). This led to either a sort of pluralism 
and/or mixture of local and “global” institutions and norms. This process, labelled 
“norm subsidiarity” (Acharya 2011: 96), results in differences between various sub-
regional systems (e.g. the European and the Middle Eastern one) and the global sys-
tem and a specific sub-regional system (e.g. the global and the Middle Eastern one).
A few specifics endeavours have already been made in the literature to understand 
regional systems or institutions through the application of the English School, e.g. 
that of Narine (2006) regarding the ASEAN region, the analysis of Stivachtis (2008) 
regarding the expansion of the European Union and its norms, or the edited volume 
of Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (2009) on the Middle Eastern international society. 
Costa-Brunelli (2015) conceptualises such geopolitical constructs as “linguistic con-
texts” which actually give different meaning to the same institutions (such as sover-
eignty). This means that even in the highly unlikely scenario that the same primary 
institutions are strong to the same extent in all regions, the regions themselves would 
not necessarily work the same as they can give different meaning and substance to 
the “common” rules.
Contrary to regional differences, the English School “has surprisingly little to say 
about (…) small states” (Maas 2005: 1).2 As small state studies evolved mostly in 
the neorealist, neoliberal and the constructivist framework (Neumann and Gstöhl 
2006: 16–17), “other theoretical traditions”, including the ES, “devote more time 
and attention to larger states, or great powers, than they do to small states” (Neal 
2017: 34). Nonetheless, the investigation of the regional alterations of primary insti-
tutions can have severe added value to the study of small states—a notion echoed by 
Chong and Maas (2010: 382) who urged English School scholars to pay more atten-
tion to small states.
That call, so far, has been mostly neglected. The most notable exemption was 
a paper written by Maas (2005).3 His research question was whether the anarchic 
society that has emerged in the last centuries is beneficial for small states or not. 
Through the investigation of the development of the international society since the 
seventeenth century, he arrives to the conclusion that the exact meaning of both 
power and size “can only be determined if it is compared to the overall system”.
The most important lesson provided by the analysis of Maas is that the position of 
small states has been shaped by the evolution of the primary (and secondary) insti-
tutions of the international society. For most of the researches in small state stud-
ies, “the starting point of analysis remains the realist leading of power” (Chong and 
Maas 2010: 382). Therefore, the observations they make usually point to the security 
deficit and weakness arising from smallness, leading to a limited under-the-radar 
2 Small states will be defined as those states whose territory, population, economic output and military 
capacities are below the average of a given region.
3 Besides him, Wight (1978) wrote about weak actors of international relations; nevertheless, his con-
ceptual framework does not exactly fit that of small state studies.
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foreign policy which prefers international organisations and law, bandwagoning and 
diplomatic settlement of disputes.
This observation also suggests that if specific primary institutions are altered in 
different eras and regions, the leverage of small states is also subject to change. The 
most important question is which are the primary institutions which effect the situ-
ation of small states to the greatest extent. Reviewing the literature, my argument is 
that two pairs of such norms should be in the focus of investigation.
The first of these is “state” and “sovereignty”. Depending on the conceptualisa-
tion of statehood, size can have different consequences. In the neorealist framework 
(Waltz 1979: 87–89), states are functionally identical actors in world politics, which 
“are differentiated from one another”, “not by function but primarily by capability. 
(…) Inequalities across states have greater political impact than inequalities across 
income groups within states” (Waltz 1999: 698). Consequently, states are basically 
black boxes which should be considered the sovereign actors on their territories. 
Neoliberals, on the other hand, have a different understanding of states and sover-
eignty. They argue that the domestic and international institutional environment of 
states determines their international behaviour to a great extent, depriving size of 
being the single most dominant independent variable of foreign policy. Katzenstein 
(1985) described how the political culture and flexible economic system of small 
European states led to their resilience during major economic crises. Besides him, 
many writers—including Vital (1967) or Thorhallson (2006)—investigated how the 
institution building of foreign policy frameworks inside small state effects their rela-
tions with other states and international organisations. Recently, a few attempts have 
been made to tackle various manifestations of statehood in small state studies (e.g. 
Chong 2014 or Taylor 2014), but only on a case study basis.
The second pair of primary institutions which is a matter of difference between 
the three schools of small state studies is “conflict” and “cooperation”. In an envi-
ronment where armed conflict is allowed and seen as an everyday phenomenon, 
small states face constant threats from the outside. But if regional politics are con-
structed in an institutionalised, cooperative manner (like in Europe), small states 
are safer and have the potential to be more influential. The most striking difference 
between the neorealist and neoliberal school derives from the different descrip-
tion of the importance of conflict and zero sum games in international anarchy.4 In 
order to form our expectations regarding the behaviour of small states in a specific 
regional system, first we have to understand the local manifestation of the norm 
pairs of “state” and “sovereignty” as well as “conflict” and “cooperation”.
4 While not using the vocabulary of the English School, Wivel et al. (2014: 21) arrived to similar con-
clusions regarding the importance of these norms. Upon the comparison of the security of small states 
inside and outside Europe, they argued that in the investigation of regional and sub-regional particulari-
ties have explanatory value if it includes “the local concept of statehood” (i.e. the primary institutions of 
“state” and “sovereignty”) and “of interstate relations” (i.e. norms related to conflict and cooperation).
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State and sovereignty in the Middle East and North Africa
Changing the agent: “states” and “regimes”
The variety of polities and social organisation formats we usually call “states” con-
stitutes the primary type of organised and institutionalised political communities. 
The most influential type of such organisations is the modern or Westphalian state, 
which has been the cornerstone of international relations since the seventeenth 
century. While this concept is still hard to define, we can set the minimal criteria 
with which an institution should be attributed with in order to call it a modern state 
(Coporaso 2000: 8–11). These include:
• authority (the recognised right to rule over a specific territory and people);
• sovereignty (being the final authority, having the ultimate right to decide);
• territoriality (the jurisdiction should be attributed with spatial boundaries); and
• citizenship (institutionalised membership in the political community based on 
explicit rights and responsibilities).
This model, which is built on Weberian and international legal viewpoints, is 
taken by granted by various disciplines in IR, including small state studies. Nev-
ertheless, this concept focuses on the juridical attributes of statehood and not its 
empirical manifestation (Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 3) which can vary consider-
ably due to historical reasons. Modern statehood—as a primary institution of the 
Europe-born international society—got exported to other regions in two steps: First, 
Western empires constituted the institutional framework in a top-down manner, after 
which local leaders provided the content to it (Hinnebusch 2018: 392–393.). This 
content comprised mostly of local traditions, the narrative of the elites regarding 
modernity and their attempt to strengthen their power. This process led to markedly 
different concepts of statehood and sovereignty in different regions—the post-colo-
nial Asian small states, which were build upon Buddhist notions and the so-called 
mandalic system (Chong 2014) work and behave differently than e.g. the African 
development state (Taylor 2014).
In the Middle Eastern context, the process started out as a voluntary development 
conducted by the Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century, as the leaders perceived 
their relative decline; thus, they started to copy Western institutional solutions. In 
parallel with this “defensive modernisation” (Anderson 1987: 5.), the British and 
French governments expanded their influence in the MENA region and started to 
forcibly change local political and social institutions. This coerced modernisation, 
which continued with the mandate system, led to the creation of most of the cur-
rently existing Arab states.
The new rulers, let them be pro- or anti-Western, accommodated and accepted 
the Westphalian system as they built up their authority, they limited their aspirations 
geographically, and they started to engage in a realist competition among themselves 
despite the general pan-Arabic rhetoric (Lawson 2000: 529). Naturally, the process 
did not happen overnight—according to Hinnebusch (2014: 36–54), it was only in 
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the 1970s that state-building efforts resulted in profoundly realist foreign policy cal-
culations—but it definitely led to a regional system of nation-states which, at first 
glance, fulfils the criteria of modernity.
In practice, nonetheless, the situation is more complex. Statehood in the Middle 
East is an example of linguistical alterations of specific global primary institutions 
proposed by Costa-Brunelli (2015). The word “state” (daula in Arabic, doulat in 
Persin and devlet in Turkish) appears in the regional political discourse to describe 
modern states, though it incorporates a slightly different meaning (N. Rózsa 2018: 
17–18). Until the twentieth century, the world had not referred to the concept of 
modern state, but rather to “the high office and authority of the person on govern-
ance” and to the institutions through it governs (ibid). Throughout history, politi-
cal power has been exercised through other types of institutionalised political com-
munities, including tribes and empires, a phenomenon which continued to effect 
political dynamics even after the formal introduction of modern states in the nine-
teenth–twentieth century. The result has been a mixture of old and new attributes 
which created a markedly different framework than IR is used to as a discipline.
To understand the function of the Middle Eastern state, the best way is to enlist 
the basic alterations vis-á-vis the idea of Westphalian state. Hinnebusch (2018) sum-
marised the most important differences in the following points:
• Identity/territorial incongruity: The pre-Westphalian structure of the regional 
society was built on identity units smaller (e.g. tribes) and larger (e.g. the umma) 
than national communities. As a result, state-promoted national identities have 
always had to suffer competition both from inside and outside of state bounda-
ries.
• Hybrid power technologies: The Weberian legal rational authority was also 
imported with the modern state system, which incorporated the already existing 
power accumulation techniques, resulting in a hybrid political culture. The con-
cept of neo-patrimony (Sharabi 1988) refers to a similar phenomenon.
• Semi-sovereignty to neo-medievalism and heterarchic non-Westphalian govern-
ance: As a result of weak institutional structures, the constant intervention of 
external powers and unpreparedness for globalisation, Middle Eastern states suf-
fer a loss of their sovereignty and their power is partly transferred to sub- and 
supranational actors.
• Nonlinear trajectories: State-building efforts did not take place as a constant pro-
gressive development but rather a bell-curved shape which peaked in the 1970s 
but started to decline as a result of market-oriented reforms in the 1990s.
• Failing statehood and proxy wars: Due to all these attributes of statehood, state 
institutions did not manage to strengthen themselves and to exercise complete 
authority. This can easily result in civil wars and exposure to external power 
competition.
As a result of all these phenomena, the actor of Middle Eastern international poli-
tics is not necessarily the state itself but rather the regime (Brichs 2013; Brichs and 
Lampridi-Kemou 2013). Throughout history, different local elites (tribes, religious 
groups, etc.) fought for power in the MENA region, a competition which was not 
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ended but transformed by the rise of modern state structures. The state was consid-
ered to be the ultimate resource in the rivalry, and the elite groups which managed to 
get the control over it did everything to reproduce its dominance. As a result, the rul-
ing elites merged with some state institutions, resulting in the creation of regimes. 
This dynamic constantly reproduces the weakness of state legitimacy, as it inher-
ently built on exclusion and neo-patrimonial structures of families, clans or tribes 
(Sharabi 1988: 35).
The regime structure is not uncommon in other regions after decolonisation 
(Jackson 2009), and the argument can be made that smallness of the state incen-
tivises its development. Despite the theoretical discussion in comparative politics 
regarding the connection between democracy or power-sharing culture and small 
state size, empirical investigation shows that “smallness produces a variety of infor-
mal mechanisms that undermine democracy”, especially “clientism, personalistic 
politics and executive domination” (Veenendaal 2020: 80). As a result, the “omnipo-
tent and ubiquitous” state is more likely to be captured by elites and will work “as 
the employer of last resort, and a (…) person-driver apparatus that dispenses (…) 
benefits, especially to the politically sympathetic” (Baldacchino 2014: 247).
This particularity has many consequences for the behaviour of actors dressed as 
“states”. For a regime, the Westphalian dichotomy of domestic peace and external 
anarchy is not paramount. Regimes implement an “omni-balancing strategy”, always 
turning one eye to the domestic challengers of their rule (David 1991; Colombo 
2017: 56–58), which blurs the line between domestic and foreign policy. Such a 
behaviour is not unique to the MENA region, e.g. in the case of South-Asian small 
states, Chong (2014: 206) also observes an “intermestic” concept of security, argu-
ing that “the management of small states’ problems requires constant calibration 
between domestic and external pressures”.
Consequently, the main line of division will not lie between the domestic and 
the foreign sphere but between the intra-regime and extra-regime sphere. Everything 
outside of the regime (let that be inside or outside of the “national” borders) will be 
considered as potentially hostile, questioning the institution of citizenship in a West-
phalian sense. The peace of the domestic sphere is transferred to the intra-regime 
sphere, where political dynamics are markedly different than outside of it.5 Similar 
to the Westphalian domestic sphere, if a problem occurs inside the regime, it is usu-
ally a grave concern that can undermine governability to a great extent.
As it is easily observable, the above described circumstances effected all states in 
the MENA region regardless of their size. Nonetheless, I would argue that due to a 
number of reasons, the particularities of the Middle Eastern state system are actually 
beneficial for small states.
First, states of the MENA region cannot draw a protective line between domes-
tic and foreign politics, exposing them to the outside environment. They are inher-
ently “weak penetrated states” (Hinnebusch 2018: 392) from the perspective of the 
5 That is the reason behind the observation made by Northedge (1976: 172) regarding the foreign policy 
of post-colonial states not being determined by systemic developments but internal “requirements” (i.e. 
regime security).
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international society; therefore, in international politics, intervening in each others’ 
domestic affairs is a common practice (Halliday 2009: 15–17). This can be benefi-
cial for small states in two ways: First, interference is a more efficient tool than wag-
ing war against one another, which lowers the chances of traditional interstate wars, 
the most frightful scenario for small states. Second, the ability to interfere into each 
other’s domestic affairs or to withhold such an endeavour is not linked exclusively 
with the possession of material resources. The former is not necessarily an expen-
sive tool and can only require an effective soft power strategy while the latter is 
pretty much dependent on social cohesion and the management of social grievances. 
While material resources are necessary for both, but they do not require as much as 
e.g. building up a national competitive army.
Second, due to the weakness of states, there is a large room to manoeuvre for 
non-state actors, especially Islamic movements (including charities, networks and 
political parties), violent groups questioning the monopoly of the state to use legiti-
mate power (Valensi 2015) or NGOs. While such actors definitely possess agency, 
they can easily be used as foreign policy tools (Kausch 2017; Marchetti and Al Zah-
rani 2017). Such instruments  are effective in interfering in other states’ domestic 
affairs and are cheaper than traditional coercive methods and thus can easily be used 
by small states as well—moreover, they do not have a comparative disadvantage in 
doing so. One can think of Qatar and its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood 
as an example.
Third, due to omni-balancing, larger states are discouraged from the traditional 
militarisation of international politics (the ultimate fear of small states). Since 
all regimes have to care about the domestic consequences of their foreign policy 
actions, building up an over-excessive army does not come without any politi-
cal costs. Due to a phenomenon which is called the “insecurity dilemma” (Jack-
son 2009: 148), the development of coercive capacities can easily harm the balance 
between domestic elites, as opposition groups consider such steps as threatening 
their survival, incentivising them to stand up against the government. This does not 
mean that militarisation is out of the question, but it comes with the price of endan-
gering domestic peace. This represents not just a limitation for larger states but also 
a possibility for smaller states to intervene in the domestic affairs of larger states and 
cause problems in the backyard of the regimes.
As a result, the regional manifestation of the modern state phenomenon has in 
general a positive effect on the position of small states as it shrinks the gap between 
the power they and larger states can exercise. While their security is also diminished 
by the penetrability of domestic affairs, so is their larger neighbours’; on the other 
hand, they are vested with non-traditional tools (e.g. the usage of non-state actors) 
which enlarges their leverage. This points to the conclusion that the realist idea of 
the congeniality of states is invalid in the MENA system.
Case study: comparing the case of Qatar and Bahrain
Though the small Gulf states are not identical in size, they have a systemically alike 
situation. As it is predicted by small state theory, the security of the five states got 
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exposed to the developments taking place in their neighbourhood, including the 
three Gulf wars, the foreign policy changes in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, and the 
rising instability in Yemen and Iraq. Nonetheless, their security perceptions and 
behaviour differed to a great extent in the last decades, a phenomenon which can 
be attributed to the above described particularities of the Middle Eastern state. To 
prove that turning our attention to regimes is vital to understand the foreign policy 
differences between “small states” having systemically similar positions, I will com-
pare the case of Qatar and Bahrain. I argue that the different intra-regime dynamic 
and the different level of social cohesion in the two states, in the Middle Eastern 
context, matter more than size.
At first glance, the Bahraini and the Qatari regime seems very similar to each 
other (Byman and Green 1999; Crystal 2014; Davidson 2012; Ismael and Ismael 
2011). Both are based on the alliance between a Sunni family (the Khalifa and the 
Thani, respectively) and the British empire which manifested in a bilateral agree-
ment. Both political systems are characterised by centralised and personalised 
decision-making and rentierism. Both states have a monarchic system, a written 
constitution, and both include some form of representative consultative bodies but 
centralise political and economic power.
In spite of these similarities, there are two major dimensions in which the Bah-
raini and Qatari system is profoundly different, both of which gain importance due 
to the special nature of the Middle Eastern states. The most important difference 
between the two states is observable in terms of social cohesion. The Khalifa family 
has always fought with domestic opposition in the Bahraini society due to at least 
three reasons (Kinninmont 2011: 32; Louer 2014: 118–119): The majority of the 
population is Shia; the family does not originate from Bahrain and consequently is 
not part of the indigenous Baharna population, and many criticise the monarchic 
structure as a form of government. These grievances are coupled with, according 
to social memory, the warfare resulting from economic mismanagement, which 
leads to a long-term lack of competitiveness in Bahrain (Fuccaro 2009: 16–42). As a 
result, the Bahraini government has always had to face chronic dissatisfaction from 
the population, resulting in a series of large-scale protests between the 1920s and the 
1970s (Ulrichsen 2014: 334–335).
Besides the utilisation of the traditional rentier logic, the main tools in the hands 
of the regime have been limited steps of liberalisation (Crystal 2014: 172) and 
strengthening the sectarian narrative (Diwan 2014: 144). Due to the Iranian revolu-
tion, it was not difficult to build on the anti-Iranian sentiments of Sunni communities 
on the other side of the Persian Gulf; that is why securitising the “Shia threat” has 
been effective. This tool came in handy during the “Arab Spring” events in 2011 
(Matthiesen 2013: 33–49; Khalaf 2013), when, after a failed attempt to appease the 
demonstrators with promise of a direct financial transfer to each families (Barany 
2012: 23), the government managed to de-incentivise many of the Sunni protestors 
by emphasising the sectarian nature of the demonstrations. Eventually this was not 
enough, and the government turned to the help of the GCC which implemented a 
short supportive intervention to ensure the survival of the regime.
Due to the lacking social cohesion and the sensitive social cleavages, Bahrain 
got exposed to outside interference. Iran, on the one hand, managed to enlarge its 
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influence through the Shia Islamist networks, not necessarily after 1979, but rather 
in the 2010s. Saudi Arabia, on the other, also enlarged its influence over the deci-
sion-making of Bahrain since 2011. Riyadh has already had considerable influence 
in the island state, due to the perceived Iranian threat and the close economic rela-
tions between the two states, but since the Bahraini Spring, the dependency of the 
regime on Saudi support deepened. One manifestation of the growing Saudi influ-
ence is the growing pressure on the Bahraini Muslim Brotherhood network (centred 
at the Islamic Mimbar society), which historically has been closer to the govern-
ment than to the Shia opposition (despite all ideological differences), but recently 
the regime pushed back against them (Freer and Cafiero 2017). This seems like in 
line with the Saudi security interests, and not necessarily the Bahraini ones. Also, in 
2018, some news surfaced about the Saudi and Emirati pressure on removing prime 
minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa from his position (Middle East Eye 2018).
In contrast, social cohesion is much stronger in Qatar. Due to the lack of consid-
erable economic capacities before the discovery of hydrocarbons and the peripheral 
position of the country, the economic elites never managed to balance the ruling 
family’s power. The Shia population (considered to be around 20% of the society) 
has always been well integrated without any considerable anti-establishment aspira-
tions (Kamrava 2014: 161).
Such level of social homogeneity allowed the Qatari government to have a wider 
leverage as outside actors did not manage to penetrate the Qatari society to a danger-
ous extent. Even after the time of the Gulf rift of 2017, the Saudi leadership and its 
allies did not manage to build up a considerable opposition to the current leadership. 
Moreover, the public support of the leadership was visible after 2017, and while it 
was probably partly an organised political campaign, it had a social background.
Social cohesion did not only defend Qatar from outside intervention but also 
enlarged its foreign policy leverage. The omni-balancing efforts of the regime did 
not have the necessity to constantly bearing in mind the domestic consequences of 
their actions on the international level. That allowed the Thani family to build rela-
tions with regional and global players without any trade-offs—this resulted in the 
ability to build up a hedging strategy (Kamrava 2014: 167–181) which aims at main-
taining stable relations with anyone.
The other dimension in which there is considerable difference between the two 
states is intra-regime dynamics. Historically, the Bahraini leadership has been some-
what unified without any spectacular internal fights—the only succession since 
independence took place in 1999 after the death of Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa. He 
was followed by Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, who was the designated heir since 1994. 
Another sign of stability is the fact that the aforementioned Khalifa bin Salman Al 
Khalifa has held prime ministership since independence (Kinninmont 2011: 40).
The most important intra-regime development recently was the rise of the Kha-
walid branch of the Khalifa family. Members of this branch were forced out of the 
country in the early twentieth century due to their opposition of deepening Brit-
ish–Bahraini ties and their deep anti-Shia sentiments (Diwan 2014: 162–163). After 
the succession of 1999, the Khawalid were able to get closer to power (as the mother 
of the new emir also belongs to this branch), notably with Minister of Defense Khal-
ifa bin Ahmed and Minister of the Royal Court Khaled bin Ahmed. Their sectarian 
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views heavily contributed to the growing sectarian discourse which was constantly 
reproduced by the regime after 2011 (Gengler 2013).
The rise of the Khawalids effected the foreign policy of Bahrain as well. The 
harsh anti-Shia approach represented by the branch is very compatible with the cur-
rent Saudi leaderships regional vision, which is why they are known to be close to 
Riyadh. For example, in 2011, they supported the Gulf Union initiative of Saudi 
Arabia, which was vehemently rejected by other GCC members (Guzansky 2015: 
25–28; Wehrey 2013: 135–136).
While the Qatari regime is considered to be functioning without any serious inter-
nal cracks, historically this has not been the case. Since independence, two forceful 
successions took place—in 1972 and 1995 (Kamrava 2013; Crystal 2014). The first 
peaceful power transition went through as late as 2013, when Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani was replaced by his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Among these succes-
sions, the one in 1995 had the gravest importance as it changed the foreign policy of 
the country profoundly. Emir Khalifa, who ruled between 1972 and 1995, conducted 
a low profile foreign policy, mostly following the lead of Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, 
when he was forced to give the throne to Hamad, the new emir did everything to 
push his father’s men out of power. This practically meant a break-up with Riyadh 
as well, since the Saudis (preferring stability over unpredictability) organised a reac-
tionist coup attempt against Hamad.
This is one of the main roots of the anti-Saudi foreign policy of Qatar for the next 
two decades. The tensions between the Thanis loyal to Hamad (which includes his 
son, Tamim as well) and those preferring a pro-Saudi stance represented by Khalifa 
came into picture after the Gulf rift of 2017, after which Riyadh started to build up a 
royal opposition to Tamim, without any apparent success.
As one can clearly see, intra-regime struggles and social cohesion heavily effect 
the foreign policy leverage and strategy of both Bahrain and Qatar. In the former 
case, the rise of the Khawalid branch contributed to the sectarian policies after 2011, 
which, due to the lack of national cohesion, opened up the country to Saudi (top-
down) and Iranian (bottom-up) interference. When it comes to Qatar, social homo-
geneity enabled the regime to conduct a more independent foreign policy, but the 
violent succession process of 1995 put the country on a collision course with Saudi 
Arabia. These developments gain importance and meaning in the context of the 
modified primary institution of the modern state in the MENA region.
Small regimes in the regional Millieu of conflict and cooperation
Norms related to conflict and cooperation
War has always been constituted as a norm in the interstate society of modern states; 
nonetheless, its substance and its legal and normative limitations have varied exten-
sively. As it was already mentioned, one of the motives behind the creation of rules 
for the interstate society was to avoid a full-scale armed conflict, but that does not 
mean that the use of force was excluded as a social practice or as a “settled pattern 
of behaviour” (Bull 2002: 178).
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The substance of the norm of “war” has changed profoundly in the last century 
on the global level. The legitimacy of attacking another state narrowed down con-
siderably (Buzan 2004: 182); Buzan even argued for the replacement of the norm 
to “great power management”, which suggests that the current rules of the interstate 
society deprive states of the possibility to pursue wars for self-interests and only 
allows them to use force in the case of a collective goal (set by the Security Council) 
or self-defence.
While one can easily think of the MENA region as a conflictual society, the ques-
tion is more complicated. The Middle Eastern system had many armed conflicts 
(e.g. between Israel and its neighbours or the Gulf wars) as the developments which 
limited the usage of armed force on the global stage (namely interdependences, 
democratisation and institutionalisation) have been absent in the region, creating a 
highly unstable environment (Hinnebusch 2014).
Balance of power dynamics incentivised war as well. Due to the penetrated 
nature of the MENA region and to the inherent institutional weakness of states, 
a regional hegemon has never been able to arise. The presence of global pow-
ers and their domestic weaknesses limit the leverage of regional pillars, making 
power more dispersed on the international level (Commins 2014: 2). This phe-
nomenon actually accelerated since 2011, resulting in a competitive multipolarity 
(Kausch 2014). Lacking hegemony—while enlarges the influence of small and 
medium-sized powers—makes the eruption of interstate wars theoretically more 
likely as there is no actor in the society which is able to provide peace as a public 
good.
On the other hand, there are existing regional norms which limit the political 
ability of states to start traditional wars. The most important among these is Arab 
solidarity—due to the supranational nature of Arabism, nationalism has not driven 
conflict but provided a normative basis of togetherness of states and their communi-
ties. Until 1990, when Iraq attacked Kuwait, these norms prohibited Arab states to 
start an armed conflict against each other (Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009: 105), delegitimis-
ing traditional war as a political tool in inter-Arab politics.
The prohibition of interstate wars between Arab states is rooted in both history 
and culture and not in material variables investigated by neorealism or neoliberal-
ism. Islam does not set out a specific way to manage international relations, though 
in practice, it contributed to the emergence of a binary worldview differentiating 
between the Umma and others (Saeed 2006: 6; Bennison 2009: 45). The norm of 
waging wars belonged to the latter region (dar al-harb). This normative distinc-
tion was reinforced by the imperial heritage of Middle Eastern political communi-
ties which was also based on such a dichotomy—institutions outside of the borders 
of the empire are not recognised as legitimate (Steunebrink 2008: 10). A similar 
logic was inherited by the Arab states—as most of their constitution proclaims that 
they are part of the Arab nation, they officially constitute a region where war is not 
acceptable. This is a great feature of the MENA interstate society for small states as 
a traditional armed conflict is on top of their concerns.
Naturally, as I already mentioned, this normative particularity did not mean the 
elimination of all hostile competition. Arab togetherness did not eliminate conflict; 
it just reshaped the way in which conflict was managed. There are at least two ways 
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in which we can see the limitation of the above described development: First, con-
nected to the distinct nature of statehood described in the second part, intervening in 
each others’ affairs has been common (Halliday 2009: 15–17).
Second, as Arab nationalism got weaker after the failed Arab–Israeli conflict, so 
did the norm of prohibiting inter-Arab wars. This process of normative fragmenta-
tion (Barnett 1998) (which coincided with the Iraqi–Kuwaiti war as well, causing 
additional division in the Arab world) resulted in decrease in pan-Arab togetherness 
and the rise of regional identities and in the weakening of the prohibition of inter-
state conflicts.
This shows that this prohibition has never been deeply institutionalised (Hinne-
busch 2014: 17). The most important derivative secondary institution of the man-
agement of intra-Arab affairs has been the League of Arab States. This secondary 
institution will be the subject of the following case study.
Case study: The League of Arab States as the protector of small states
The League of Arab States (or the Arab League) was created in 1945 as the first 
regional organisation in the United Nations framework. According to its Charter 
(Mithaq Jamiah al-Daul al-Arabiyah wa-Mullaqatihu 2017), the primary norms it 
seeks to protect in the Arab world are cooperation, independence and sovereignty.
Naturally, many criticise the Arab League of being an ineffective, only nomi-
nally functioning organisation without any substance (Little 1956; Toffolo 2008: 
121–122). Farah Dakhlallah argues that the League is a “product of the dilemma 
between state sovereignty and Arab nationalism” and thus has been unable to work 
effectively (Dakhlallah 2012: 393). Despite the truthfulness of such criticism, I 
would like to argue that the Arab League plays a highly relevant normative role in 
the Middle Eastern interstate society.
The importance of the Arab League  for small states is twofold. First, it creates 
and reproduces the culture of consensus-based intergovernmental cooperation based 
on the respect of equality deriving from the mutual acceptance of sovereignty (Hin-
nebusch 2014; Murden 2009). This provides a great environment for small states 
as it deprives status-seeking great powers to force their will on others in the Arab 
League framework.
Small member states of the institution have always played an active role in both 
the creation and the operation of the League (Solingen 2008: 284–285). One way 
in which they contributed to the work was participating in mediation—between 
1945 and 2000, they played a role in 45% of all facilitation talks in the Arab League 
framework (Yassine-Hamdan and Pearson 2014: 93–94).
The other way in which the Arab League plays an important role for small states 
is the normative protection gained by membership. As the League itself is a deriva-
tive institution of the Arab identity and togetherness, membership can be translated 
as a recognition of being part of the Arab interstate society. This, in practice, means 
a normative (not actual) protection from external attacks.
A prime example of the manifestation of such defence mechanisms was the 
membership bid of Kuwait (Yassine-Hamdan and Pearson 2014: 117–126). Before 
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gaining independence in June 1961, the emirate was a British protectorate; there-
fore, the external defence of the territory was provided by London. Right before and 
after the Kuwait became a full-fledged independent state, the Iraqi prime minister 
repeatedly declared that Kuwait belongs to Iraq (Podeh 2003: 103.). The crisis got 
global as the Security Council met to discuss the possible alternatives, with a strong 
British and Soviet involvement. Nonetheless, the Sabah regime turned to the League 
of Arab States as well, and one of the first diplomatic steps it took was to apply for 
membership in the organisation. The most probable explanation for this move was 
the perception of the protective function of the membership. As it was predictable, 
Iraq immediately rejected the membership proposition, but other states (first and 
foremost Saudi Arabia) supported the Kuwaiti side.
The secretary-general of the League, Abdel Khalek Hassouna, decided to medi-
ate between the stakeholders. According to Ahmed Al-Rashidi (Al-Rashidi 1992: 
38–42), he wanted to make the involving actors to accept four basic principles for 
conflict management:
• exclusion of non-Arab actors (primarily the Security Council);
• finding a peaceful solution to avoid non-Arab military intervention;
• avoiding a rift in Arab nationalism by accepting Kuwait as an independent 
member of the Arab society;
• maintaining unity among Arab states.
These principles show clearly how Arab nationalism and togetherness are con-
nected to sovereign equality and the normative protection deriving from it for all 
member states, let them be small or large. It also shows that this phenomenon is 
also connected to the perception of the penetrated nature of the MENA region—
the urge to avoid foreign intervention and the desire to find Arab solutions to 
Arab problems incentivise unity and cooperation over conflict.
Eventually, the conflict was resolved by an Arab League council meeting tak-
ing place on the 20th of July. On the peak of the debate, the Iraqi diplomats left 
the negotiations, after which all remaining members accepted the membership 
bid of Kuwait. The fact that Iraq acquiesced to the decision and did not attack 
the country (at least until 1990) shows that membership did provide protection to 
Kuwait.
It is important to mention that the crisis and the activities of Hassouna (himself 
being an Egyptian citizen) can also be interpreted as the actions of Nasser in the 
context of an Egyptian–Iraqi fight for power (Podeh 2003). This narrative does not 
contradict the previously outlined one about the protective role of membership as 
they are highly compatible with each other. The normative environment of the Mid-
dle Eastern society does not prohibit states to pursue their interests, but it creates an 
environment in which, according to Barnett (quoted by Podeh 2003), “state interests 
are legitimised with reference to a normative order, and the regional [Arab] order is 
still secured through negotiations and not military coercion alone”.
Naturally, the process of normative fragmentation questions whether the Arab 
League can continue to provide such a role in the Middle Eastern society. Not-
withstanding, surprisingly enough, we can see a very similar function for the 
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organisation during the Arab Uprisings, though from a contradicting way. In 2011, 
first time in its history, the League decided to expel Libya from its members refer-
ring to humanitarian concerns, and at the same time, it endorsed a military interven-
tion against the Qaddafi regime (Wajner and Kacowicz 2018: 504–505). Though the 
intervention itself was not organised by Arab states (as it was built up by Western 
countries on the basis of UNSCR 1973), two Arab countries, namely Qatar and the 
UAE, participated. This case, again, clearly shows the connection between member-
ship and the prohibition of war. Contrarily, the Arab League provided legitimacy for 
the Bahraini regime in 2011 by not attempting to withdraw its membership.
A similar process took place with Syria, when the Arab League (after a quick 
mediation attempt) suspended its membership in November 2011 and introduced 
sanctions against the Assad regime. After that, several Arab states intervened in the 
civil war, mostly in support of the opposition (Küçükkeleş 2012). Eight years later, 
the reintegration of Syria to the Arab interstate society slowly started, but it prob-
ably only be concluded with the reinstallation of its membership in the League of 
Arab States.
Conclusion: altering the vocabulary of small state studies
The aim of the study was to investigate how mainstream theories of small state 
studies should be altered to be applicable to regions outside of Europe, more 
specifically to the MENA region. I argued that that the neorealist and neoliberal 
school have been designed to analyse mostly the small states of the Western seg-
ment of the international society, but they neglect possible alterations which are 
visible in other regions. That is why they fail to interpret the leverage of Middle 
Eastern small states in a comprehensive manner.
When it comes to the necessary modifications, I argued that two have to be 
made to analyse the foreign policy of small Middle Eastern states. First of all, the 
phenomenon of modern statehood is heavily altered in the MENA region, which 
manifests itself mostly in the regime structure and the penetrability of state bor-
ders, which forces states to omni-balance. This means that it will be social homo-
geneity and intra-regime dynamics which determine the leverage of governments 
and not necessarily the size of the state Secondly, norms related to conflict and 
cooperation provides some level of security to small Arab states as Arab solidar-
ity (even today) prohibits the initiation of interstate wars between members of the 
Arab community.
The relevance of these two modifications is not limited to the MENA region as 
the norms related to statehood, sovereignty, conflict and cooperation are not equal 
in different regional systems in the world. Consequently, both the theories of small 
state studies and its vocabulary need to change to be applicable to regions outside of 
Europe. Focusing solely on states as actors is not sufficient enough due to various 
manifestations of statehood in the world. To understand how smallness effects polit-
ical players, we should be open to institutions different from the Westphalian state.
Analysing the behaviour of “small regimes” presents such a possibility by tak-
ing into account the process of norm subsidiarity taking place in societies like that 
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of the Middle East. This model can be used in other parts of the world too, though 
not automatically—specific changes of the norms of state, sovereignty, conflict and 
cooperation should be analysed as well to reflect the complexity of political com-
munities. This is the only way to thoroughly understand the dynamics between small 
and large, as well as strong and weak actors in the international community.
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